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Both in the design and deployment of blockchain solutions many performance-impacting
configuration choices need to be made. We introduce BlockSim, a framework and
software tool to build and simulate discrete-event dynamic systems models for
blockchain systems. BlockSim is designed to support the analysis of a large variety of
blockchains and blockchain deployments as well as a wide set of analysis questions.
At the core of BlockSim is a Base Model, which contains the main model constructs
common across various blockchain systems organized in three abstraction layers
(network, consensus, and incentives layer). The Base Model is usable for a wide variety
of blockchain systems and can be extended easily to include system or deployment
particulars. The BlockSim software tool provides a simulator that implements the Base
Model in Python. The paper describes the Base Model, the simulator implementation,
and the application of BlockSim to Bitcoin, Ethereum and other consensus algorithms.
We validate BlockSim simulation results by comparison with performance results from
actual systems and from other studies in the literature. We close the paper by a BlockSim
simulation study of the impact of uncle blocks rewards on mining decentralization, for a
variety of blockchain configurations.
Keywords: blockchain, performance, simulation, analysis, proof of work, consensus, Ethereum, Bitcoin
1. INTRODUCTION
In the design as well as the deployment of blockchain solutions, many architectural, configuration
and parameterization questions need to be considered. Since it is usually not feasible or practical
to answer these questions using experimentation or trial-and-error, model-based simulation is
required as an alternative. In this paper, we propose a discrete-event simulation framework called
BlockSim (Alharby andVanMoorsel, 2019) to explore the effects of configuration, parameterization
and design decisions on the behavior of blockchain systems.
BlockSim aims to provide simulation constructs that are intuitive, hide unnecessary detail and
can be easily manipulated to be applied to a large set of blockchains design and deployment
questions (related to performance, reliability, security or other properties of interest). That is,
BlockSim has the following objectives:
1. Generality: we want to be able to use BlockSim for a large set of blockchain systems,
configurations and design questions.
2. Extensibility: BlockSim should be easy to manipulate by a designer or analyst to study different
types and aspects of blockchain systems.
3. Simplicity: the above two objectives should be met while making BlockSim easy to use, both for
simulation studies and for extending it.
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This paper expands on the short introduction of the BlockSim
framework in Alharby and Van Moorsel (2019), and discusses all
facets of the tool design, implementation and use.
At the core of BlockSim is a Base Model, which contains
model constructs at three abstraction layers: the network layer,
the consensus layer and the incentives layer (Van Moorsel et al.,
2018). The network layer captures the blockchain’s nodes and
the underlying peer-to-peer protocol to exchange data between
nodes. The consensus layer captures the algorithms and rules
adopted to reach an agreement about the current state of the
blockchain ledger. The incentives layer captures the economic
incentive mechanisms adopted by a blockchain to issue and
distribute rewards among the participating nodes.
The Base Model contains a number of functional blocks
common across blockchains, that can be extended and configured
as suited for the system and study of interest. The main
functional blocks include Node, Transaction, Block, Consensus
and Incentives, as we describe in section 3. These are then
implemented through a number of Python modules, discussed
in section 4, and complemented by modules (event, scheduler,
statistics, etc.) that implement the simulation engine.
The public nature of permissionless blockchains provides for
particularly powerful opportunities to validate the simulator. We
validate the BlockSim simulation results by comparing against
theoretical results (invariants such as block rate), against data
from the existing public blockchain systems such as Ethereum
and Bitcoin and against results from the literature. The BlockSim
simulation results are within a statistically acceptable margin of
the real-life or published results, as discussed in section 6. We
also demonstrate the use of BlockSim for a simulation study
that considers stale rate, throughput andmining decentralization,
for a range of possible blockchain configurations (not all
existing in real-life systems). Using BlockSimwe can demonstrate
that uncle inclusion (such as in Ethereum) is beneficial for
mining decentralization.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses
an overview of blockchain and its underlying layers. Also, it
discusses an overview of modeling and simulation. Section 3
discusses the core Base Model of BlockSim including the design
objectives behind it. Section 4 presents the implementation of the
Base Model. Section 5 presents the application of BlockSim to
Bitcoin, Ethereum and other consensus protocols as case studies.
Section 6 discusses the validation of BlockSim against actual
systems and studies from the literature. Sections 7 and 8 show a
BlockSim simulation study as well as the evaluation of BlockSim
against the design objectives. Section 9 discusses the related work.
Section 10 concludes the paper.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1. Blockchain Overview
A blockchain is a distributed ledger, with an aim to keep
track of all transactions that ever occurred in the blockchain
network. This ledger is replicated and distributed among the
network’s nodes. Such a ledger has two main purposes, to
provide an immutable log of all transactions, and to make the
transactions transparent (i.e., visible) to anyone inspecting or
using the blockchain.
The technologically most intriguing type of blockchain is
the public or permissionless blockchain. The main feature of
permissionless blockchains is that the nodes that participate
in maintaining the ledger do not need to be trusted or even
be known to each other. That is, any user can join and
participate in the network. Permissionless blockchains contain
a cryptocurrency, to reward nodes for investing resources
in maintaining the blockchain. The first and most popular
permissionless blockchain system is Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008),
which is a digital payment system that enables non-trusting
entities to commit financial transactions. Other blockchains (e.g.,
Ethereum, Wood, 2014) have introduced the idea of smart
contracts to support various distributed applications such as
e-voting, health applications, etc.
The term blockchain comes from the fact that data about
multiple transactions is grouped into blocks. Each block is
uniquely identified by its cryptographic hash and each block is
attached and linked to the one that came before it. This results
in a chain of blocks. Once a block is generated and attached to
the blockchain ledger, the transactions in that block cannot be
modified by any node, since it would require the node to rewrite
all subsequent blocks. This makes blockchain systems immutable
and protected against double-spending attacks (Alharby and
Van Moorsel, 2017).
Any participating node in a permissionless blockchain can
generate a transaction and broadcast it in the network. Each node
has a pool to keep pending incoming transactions (transactions
that need to be executed). To generate and attach a new block to
the blockchain ledger, a subset of the nodes (called miners) select
several pending transactions from their pools, execute them and
then create a new block containing those transactions. How and
when blocks are generated depends on the consensus protocol
adopted by the blockchain system (see section 2.2.2).
Once a miner has successfully created a block, it will then
broadcast it to other nodes in the network. Upon receiving the
block, each node validates the block’s correctness and appends it
to its ledger. If the majority of the nodes attach the block to their
ledger and start building on top of it, the block will be confirmed
and considered as part of the blockchain ledger. Theminer of that
block can then collect a reward for the block as well as the fees
associated with its transactions as compensation for their efforts.
2.2. Blockchain in Layers
Blockchain systems can naturally be divided in three layers, the
network, consensus and incentives layer, as depicted in Figure 1.
We will utilize these layers to structure the BlockSim simulator
and therefore here provide a system explanation in layers as
well. The network layer captures the network’s nodes and the
underlying network protocol to distribute information between
nodes. The consensus layer captures the algorithms and rules
adopted to reach an agreement about the current state of the
blockchain ledger. The incentives layer captures the economic
mechanisms adopted by a blockchain to issue and distribute
rewards among the participating nodes.
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FIGURE 1 | Blockchain system layers.
2.2.1. Network Layer
The network layer in blockchain systems contains the nodes
in the network, their geographical and relative locations and
the connectivity among them. It defines which information
is to be propagated as well as the mechanism to propagate
such information.
The main constitute in the network layer is a node. A node
can be an ordinary user who wants to create and submit a
transaction to be executed and included in the ledger or a special
node, known as miner, who maintains and expands the ledger
by appending new blocks. A node has a unique identifier and
maintains its balance, a local copy of the blockchain ledger and,
if the node is a miner, an individual transactions pool. The
transactions pool keeps the pending transactions received from
other nodes in the network.
Nodes communicate the following information to each other.
If a node generates a new transaction, it cryptographically signs
it and propagates it to its peers to have it confirmed and recorded
in the blockchain ledger. In case the node is a miner, every time
it generates a block, it notifies its peers so they can validate it and
append it to their copies of the ledger.
As information propagation mechanism for blockchains
several protocols have been proposed, including relay networks
and advertisement-based protocols (Gervais et al., 2016). In the
advertisement-based protocol used in most blockchains (Gervais
et al., 2016), the node sends a notification to its peers about the
new data (e.g., a transaction). If the recipient node responds by
requesting the data, the node will send it. Otherwise, the node
will not send it as the recipient node has already had the data.
2.2.2. Consensus Layer
The consensus layer in blockchain systems defines the algorithms
and rules for reaching an agreement about the blockchain’s state
among the network’s nodes. Such rules specify which node is
eligible for generating and appending the next block to the
blockchain ledger, how often blocks are generated as well as how
to resolve potential conflicts that may occur when nodes have
multiple, differing copies of the ledger.
There are several consensus algorithms such as Proof of Work
(PoW) and Proof of Stake (PoS) that have been proposed for
blockchain systems. In PoW, nodes (i.e., miners) invest their
computing power tomaintain the ledger by attaching new blocks,
while in PoS, nodes invest their stake or money. Regardless of
what is required to be invested by the nodes, the intuition behind
such algorithms is to introduce a cost for maintaining the ledger.
The cost introduced should be more than enough to deter nodes
from behaving maliciously (Wang et al., 2019). At the same time,
nodes are only rewarded for their efforts if they follow the rules
and maintain the ledger honestly (see section 2.2.3).
To illustrate the consensus layer, we discuss the PoW
algorithm here as it is the most common algorithm for
permissionless blockchains, used by Bitcoin and Ethereum. In
PoW, the computing power invested by a miner determines
how frequent that miner will generate and append blocks to
the blockchain ledger. To generate a block, the miner has to
repeatedly try nonces (random numbers) until the hash of the
nonce combined with the block information will be within a
certain threshold (referred to as the block difficulty). The only
way to find the nonce is by trial-and-error, and thus, the more
hash power invested by a miner, the more likely that miner
will find the nonce. This process is a competitive task since all
miners in the network are competing against each other to find
the desirable hash value of the next block. Note that the block
difficulty can be dynamically adjusted to control how often blocks
are generated.
Due to the delay incurred by propagating blocks between
nodes in the network (see Network Layer), other nodes might
generate the next block before hearing of another competitive
block that has recently announced. This leads to conflicts, known
as forks, which occur when nodes have multiple, differing views
of the ledger. The task of the consensus layer in blockchain
systems is to resolve such conflicts. Different consensus
algorithms use different rules to select which blockchain (fork)
should be accepted as the global chain. For example, the
PoW algorithm used by Bitcoin and Ethereum resolves the
conflicts by adopting the longest chain. Other proposals such as
GHOST (Sompolinsky and Zohar, 2015) select the fork with the
heaviest work.
2.2.3. Incentives Layer
The incentives layer utilizes the blockchain’s cryptocurrency
to establish an incentive structure, distributing rewards among
the participating miners who maintain the blockchain’s ledger.
The incentive model is essential to maintain any permissionless
blockchain system. Incentives should compensate miners fairly
for their work and motivate them to behave honestly (Aldweesh
et al., 2018; Alharby et al., 2018). The incentives also protect the
blockchain system from various attacks (e.g., DDoS attacks in
Ethereum, Buterin, 2016) and against malicious behaviors of the
nodes (e.g., selfish mining strategies, Eyal and Sirer, 2018).
In most blockchain systems rewards are associated with
generating blocks and completing transactions, called block
reward and transaction fees, respectively. Depending on the
chain, there are subtle differences in what is rewarded, e.g.,
Ethereum issues a reward for stale (or uncle) blocks, even if they
do not make it into the blockchain when conflicts are resolved.
When a miner receives a reward (e.g., through appending a new
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block to the ledger), its balance will increase accordingly. The
block reward, in all known blockchains, is set to a fixed amount,
while the transaction fee is calculated as a variable amount of
cryptocurrencies, depending on effort as well as the prize a
transaction submitter is willing to pay.
2.3. Modeling and Simulation
A model is an abstract representation of a real system, either
existing or in design. The model usually comprises mathematical
expressions as well as structural and logical relationships to
describe the dynamics of the system (Anderson et al., 2015).
Simulation is a quantitative method, which “executes” the model
to mimic the behavior of the system (Anderson et al., 2015).
Simulation can be used to predict and describe how different
configurations and scenarios impact the behavior of the system.
Thus, simulation can be used to answer “what-if ” questions and
to experiment with new designs and policies without a need to
interrupt a functioning system (Banks, 1984).
Simulation can be classified into two categories, namely,
discrete-event simulation and continuous-event simulation
(Haverkort, 1998). Human-made systems such as digital
computer and information systems are most suitable represented
as discrete-event simulation, as the systems change state at
discrete moments in time (Fishman, 2001). BlockSim utilizes
the discrete-event simulation approach to design and implement
the simulator.
There are two approaches to develop simulation tools, namely,
general-purpose programming languages (e.g., C++, Java, or
Python) and special-purpose simulation languages (e.g., Arena
and GPSS) (Leemis and Park, 2006). The former is more flexible
and familiar, while the latter provides several built-in features
(e.g., statistics, event scheduler, and animation) that reduce the
time required to build models. As stated in Leemis and Park
(2006), there is a debate and conflict about which method
is preferable. Also worth noting are simulation frameworks
that enable developing simulation models using general-purpose
languages, for instance, OMNeT++ and SimPy for developing
models in C++ and Python.
To develop and implement BlockSim, we opt for Python
as a general-purpose language. We do not use its simulation
framework SimPy because it follows a process-oriented
paradigm, which differs from the approach we take in BlockSim.
However, it will be useful to consider integrating features
provided by SimPy with our simulator in a future version.
3. BLOCKSIM BASE MODEL
In this section, we introduce the Base Model underlying
BlockSim, which is designed to model any kind of blockchain
system, with application specific extensions as needed. We first
define the design principles and goals for BlockSim: generality,
extensibility and simplicity. Then, we discuss the design layer
by layer: Network Layer, Consensus Layer, and Incentives Layer.
Within each layer we identify the key functional units (entities)
and the actions or activities it executes.
3.1. Design Principles
We design a Base Model to fulfill the main design goals for
BlockSim, which are:
• Generality: we want to be able to use BlockSim for a large set
of blockchain systems, configurations and design questions.
• Extensibility: BlockSim should be easily manipulated
by a designer or analyst to study different aspects of
blockchain systems.
• Simplicity: the above two objectives should be met while
making BlockSim easy to use, both for simulation studies and
for extending it.
The art of designing a tool such as BlockSim is to find a useful
trade-off between generality and extensibility on the one hand,
and simplicity to achieve these two objectives on the other hand.
The Base Model is critical in achieving this goal, aiming to find
the optimal trade-off among the above three objectives for the
domain of blockchain systems.
The Base Model identifies the key building blocks (e.g.,
blocks, transactions, nodes, and incentives) common across all
blockchains BlockSim is meant for, see Figure 2. The Base Model
dictates how general the model class is that is supported by
BlockSim, and particularly how easy it is to build new models.
The Base Model will be translated in software modules and
therefore also determines if BlockSim can be extended easily, for
instance, to provide more detailed models of certain processes
that take place in blockchains.
3.2. Network Layer
This layer defines two entitiesNode and the underlying Broadcast
protocol, as depicted in Figure 2. The Node entity is responsible
for updating the system state variables (e.g., the blockchain ledger
and the transactions pool). The Broadcast protocol specifies
how information entities (e.g., Blocks and Transactions) are
propagated in the network.
Both Blockchain ledger and Transactions pool entities are part
of the Node entity (see Figure 2). That is, every node maintains
and continuously updates these entities. We model nodes as
objects that have different attributes such as unique ID, balance,
local ledger and transactions pool. The transactions pool and
the local ledger are modeled as array lists that can be extended
when new transactions and blocks are received. These attributes
are common across the different implementation of blockchains.
It could, however, be possible to extend this by including more
additional attributes, as we will show in section 5.1.
The propagation of information entities depends on the
Broadcast protocol entity, which can be modeled in detail by
accounting for the network configurations, the geographical
distribution of the nodes and the connectivity among the nodes,
or it can be modeled in an abstraction level by only considering a
time delay for propagating information among the nodes. The
reason for abstracting the broadcast protocol is to make our
simulator as simple as possible by hiding unnecessary details.
This will alleviate the user of the simulator from configuring
many parameters related to the network configurations such as
the broadcast protocol, the geographical distribution of the nodes
and the number of connections per node. Having the propagation
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FIGURE 2 | BlockSim model entities.
delay as the only configurable parameter will improve both the
efficiency and the usability aspects of the simulator.
3.3. Consensus Layer
This layer aims at establishing the rules that nodes can follow
to reach an agreement about the blockchain’s state. This layer
includes four entities, namely, Transaction, Block, Transactions
pool, and Blockchain ledger, as depicted in Figure 2.
The Blockchain ledger entity depends on the Block entity,
and the Block entity depends on the Transaction entity. That
is, the blockchain ledger is composed of blocks and blocks are
composed of transactions. The Transactions pool depends on the
Transaction entity, as every transaction created is fed into the
transactions pool. The Node entity maintains these four entities.
Within the consensus layer, there are several activities or
actions to be executed by the entities. The creation of blocks
and transactions is an example of such activities. The flow
of these activities is depicted in Figure 3. These activities run
continuously, transactions and blocks, for instance, always keep
arriving in the network.
3.3.1. Transaction
Transactions are one of the building blocks (entities) common
across all blockchain systems. It plays a significant role in
updating the blockchain’s state. The arrival of a new transaction
in the network results in updating the transactions pool by
inserting that transaction.
We model transactions in two different ways, namely, full
and light. The full technique helps to track each transaction
in the system (e.g., when a transaction has been created
and included in a valid block). This technique models
transactions as in any blockchain system, and it is useful
if one is interested in, for instance, studying the latency
of individual transactions in blockchain systems. However,
this type of modeling consumes an enormous amount of
computing resources and time during the simulation since
each transaction has to be tracked. On the other hand, the
light technique does not track each transaction. It is useful
when studying the throughput of blockchain systems without
caring about the confirmation time of transactions within
the system.
In both techniques, we model transactions as objects that
have several attributes or fields such as transaction ID, size, fee,
timestamp, contents as well as the submitter and the recipient
of the transaction. These attributes are almost common across
all blockchains, and that some systems have more additional
attributes (e.g., Ethereum has also gas-related attributes such as
Gas Limit).
Full modeling Technique: In this technique as we discussed
in section 3.2, we model an individual transactions pool for each
node by assigning an array list for each node as a way to abstract
the pool. Each transaction created by a node is propagated to
all other nodes in the network. Upon receiving the transaction,
the recipient node appends it to their pool. Thus, we model
transactions in three different activities labeled from 1 to 3, as
depicted in Figure 3.
• Creating transactions: This involves generating transactions
by the participating nodes. The number of transactions to be
created per unit of time can be controlled and configured.
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FIGURE 3 | Workflow for the consensus activities within the Base Model of BlockSim.
• Propagating transactions: This requires the creator of the
transaction to propagate it to other participating nodes. This
is to notify other nodes about the newly created transactions.
• Appending transactions: This requires the recipient of the
transaction to append it to their transactions pool.
Light modeling Technique: In this technique, we only model
a single transactions pool to be shared among all nodes in the
network. The intention behind this technique is to provide an
alternative and simplified way to model transactions by omitting
the propagation process as well as the needs for nodes to update
their pools continuously (see section 3.3.2). Thus, the light
technique is more efficient and faster during the simulation.
However, this technique cannot be used to draw conclusions
about the latency of transactions as transactions are not tracked.
Nevertheless, it is useful to get indicators about the throughput
in blockchain systems.
In this technique, we create a set of transactions (N) and
then append it to the shared pool before the mining process,
so miners can access the pool to select several transactions to
include in their forthcoming block. Hence, N should be more
than enough for a block, usually enough for two blocks. Once
a miner has successfully generated a block, the pool is reset and
then filled up with a fresh set of transactions to be included in the
next block.
Both techniques could be implemented and then the user
would be given a choice to select which method to adopt based
on their own needs. For instance, if one is only interested in
throughput, there is no need for choosing the full technique since
it makes the simulator runs for a very long time.
3.3.2. Block
Blocks are another essential building block (entity) of any
blockchain system. Blocks consist of transactions. The arrival
of a new block results in an update in the transactions pool
and blockchain ledger. The pool is updated by removing all
transactions included in the block, while the ledger is updated
by appending the newly created block.
We model blocks as objects that have several attributes,
namely, depth, block ID, previous block ID, timestamp, size,
miner ID, and transactions. The block ID is a unique identifier
for the block. The block depth indicates the index of the block
in the node’s blockchain. The miner ID refers to the node that
created the block. Each block can accept a list of transactions as
its content. These attributes are common across blockchains.
We model blocks in the consensus layer as Block Generation
and Block Reception, see Figure 3. Block generation specifies
when blocks are generated as well as which node is eligible for
appending the next blocks. It covers all the common actions
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required by a miner to create and attach a block to the blockchain
ledger. The actions embrace executing the block’s transactions,
constructing and appending the block to the local blockchain
and propagating the block to other nodes in the network.
Block reception specifies how the network’s nodes update their
blockchain ledgers upon receiving new blocks. It covers the
common activities taken by a node when receiving a newly
generated block. Upon receiving a valid block, the recipient node
will perform three actions, which are updating local blockchain
if necessary, appending the block to the local blockchain and
updating the transactions pool.
The consensus algorithm is responsible for selecting a miner
to build the next block. The methodology used to choose a miner
varies among blockchains, depending on the adopted consensus
protocol. In PoW, for instance, miners are selected based on
solving a mathematical task. Once a miner is chosen to construct
and append a new block to the ledger, the miner would undertake
the following actions. Hence, these actions are common across all
blockchain systems, and that some specific systems may include
other activities (e.g., including uncle blocks in a future block as
in Ethereum).
• Executing and adding transactions to the block: This
requires the miner to select several pending transactions to
be executed and included in the next block. Often, miners
first sort those pending transactions based on their associated
fees. Then, miners select the best transaction according to their
ranking criteria, execute it if and only if there is a space in the
block. The transaction will then be recorded in the block. After
that, miners will select the next transaction and continue until
the block is full or there is no pending transaction.
• Constructing and appending the block to the local
blockchain: After preparing the block content (e.g.,
transactions), the miner would construct the block after which
the block will be appended to the miner’s local blockchain.
• Propagating the block to other nodes: This is to propagate
the block to other nodes in the network. This is to notify the
network’s nodes about the newly generated block.
Once a node has received a new block, it will check its validity.
The block is considered valid if it was constructed correctly and
all embedded transactions were correctly executed. Beside the
block validity, the block must point to the last block in the ledger
(the block’s depth should be higher than that of the last block).
We only model the block depth, and thus, we abstract the validity
of the block. If the depth of the received block is not higher than
that of the last block, the block will be discarded. Otherwise, the
node will perform the following actions.
• Updating local blockchain: This requires the recipient
node to update its local blockchain, where necessary,
before appending the newly received block. This is because
sometimes the received block is built on different preceding
blocks (a different chain branch) compared to the ones the
recipient node has or because it is built on missing blocks.
Therefore, the node has to update all the preceding blocks
(and fetch all missing blocks if any) according to the ones the
received block is following.
• Appending the block to local blockchain: This is to append
the received block to the local copy of the blockchain.
• Updating transactions pool: This requires the recipient
node to update its transactions pool, where necessary, upon
appending the newly received block. This is to remove all the
transactions that have already been executed in the received
block from the node’s pool.
3.3.3. Transactions Pool and Blockchain Ledger
Transactions pool and blockchain ledger are also important
building blocks (entities) since they represent the state of
blockchain systems. The transactions pool is updated upon the
arrival of a new transaction or block, while the blockchain ledger
is only updated once a block has arrived, as discussed in sections
3.3.1, 3.3.2. Nodes are responsible for updating both the pool and
the ledger, as every node in the blockchain network maintains a
local copy of them (see section 3.2).
The rule of updating the ledger in the case of forks: Nodes
at some point in time may have different views of the blockchain
ledger due to the network’s propagation delay. A significant role
of the consensus layer is to define the rules that can be used
by the nodes to resolve the forks. For instance, Bitcoin and
Ethereum use the longest-chain rule to resolve the forks. That is,
nodes update their ledgers every time they receive a block that
follows a chain that is longer than their local chains. By doing
so, nodes will have the same view of the blockchain ledger. Other
systems, however, use different rules (e.g., GHOST, Sompolinsky
and Zohar, 2015).
3.4. Incentives Layer
The incentives layer is responsible for designing the underlying
incentive model by defining the rewarded elements (e.g., blocks
and transactions) as well as distributing the rewards among the
participating miners. This layer has the reward entity, which
depends on the Block entity (see Figure 2). That is, the rewards
are only given to the miners upon appending new blocks to the
ledger. The calculation and the distribution of such rewards are
considered as actions.
We model the basic incentive model used by most blockchain
systems such as Bitcoin. Our model provides a reward for
generating a valid block (block reward) and a reward for all
transactions included in a block (transaction fee). The block
reward is modeled as a fixed amount of cryptocurrency that
can be configured and changed by the end-user. The transaction
fee is calculated as the multiplication of its size and its prize,
where the prize is the amount of money the submitter of the
transaction is willing to pay per unit of size. The size and
the prize for transactions can also be configured as fixed or
variable (random) values. However, it is possible to extend the
current model to include different rewards (e.g., rewards for
uncle blocks) or change the way how the fee for transactions is
calculated. We model the distribution of rewards by increasing
the balance of each miner after having a valid block attached to
the ledger.
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FIGURE 4 | BlockSim implementation modules.
4. BLOCKSIM IMPLEMENTATION
We present the implementation of the BlockSim simulator using
Python 3.6.41. The main modules are given in Figure 4. The
Simulator Module implements the core engine of the simulator,
in particular the event scheduler, which we explain in section 4.1.
The main topic of discussion in that section is the granularity
at which events are handled, since it heavily impacts the
performance of the simulator. This simulation engine module
is complemented by the Configuration Module, to be described
in section 4.2, which provides the user with ways to configure
the simulation model and experiments. Section 4.3 explains
the implementation of the Base Model, subdivided according
to the main layers: Network Module, Consensus Module, and
Incentives Module.
4.1. BlockSim Simulation Engine and Event
Scheduler
As depicted in Figure 4, the main Simulation Module contains
four classes, which are Event, Scheduler, Statistics and Main. We
start with explaining our design choices for the event scheduling.
We provide event scheduling at two abstraction levels, the first
one considers blocks as the event “unit,” the second considers
transactions as the event “unit.” We explain the block-level
events. The class Event defines the structure of events in our
1https://github.com/maher243/BlockSim
simulator. In the case of a block-level event it has four attributes:
type, nodeID, time, and block. The attribute type indicates how
to handle the event, in particular whether the event at hand is to
create a new block or to receive an existing block. The nodeID and
time attributes specify the node that handles the event and the
time at which the event takes place. The block attribute contains
the necessary information for the block to be handled.
Scheduler class is responsible for scheduling future events and
record them in the Queue. Queue is an array list that maintains
all future events, and it is continuously updated during the
simulation by either inserting new events or removing existing
ones. At the block-level, for instance, once a block is created
through a block creation event, the Scheduler class schedules block
reception events for other nodes to receive the block. Also, it
schedules a new block creation event by selecting a miner to
propose and generate a new block on top of the last one.
The function of theMain and Statistics classes is as one would
expect. Main runs the simulator. It prepares the setup and then
triggers the Scheduler class to schedule some initial events. The
setup includes the creation of transactions as well as the creation
of the first (genesis) block, an empty block that will be attached
to the local blockchain for all the nodes in the network. Then,
it keeps going through all the events and executes them one by
one until the Queue is empty or the pre-specified simulation
time is reached. Statisticsmaintains the results and calculates the
statistics of the final output of the simulation, including block
statistics (number of blocks included in the ledger and percentage
of discarded blocks), throughput and mining profits.
4.2. Configuration Module
This module serves as the main user interface, in which users
can select from the available models as well as configuring
various parameters related to the participating nodes, blocks,
transactions, consensus, incentives and the simulation setups.
Table 1 summarizes the input parameters to be configured
before running the simulator. We can, for instance, configure
the number of nodes, the block interval time, the volume of
transactions to be created per second and other parameters.
Besides, our simulator allows disabling transactions if they are
not of interest. This can be done by only setting the parameter
hasTrans to be “False,” without modifying the code of the
simulator. Furthermore, it allows selecting a suitable technique
(either full or light) for modeling transactions. If we extend the
simulator by, for example, including new consensus protocols,
this would be reflected in this module to allow the user of the
simulator to choose the desired protocol.
4.3. Base Model Modules
We discuss the implementation of simulation classes that
represent the Base Model of section 3 using the same three layers
as before.
Network Module: We implement the network module in
two different classes, namely, Node and Network. Node class
defines the structure of nodes in our simulator. We implement
each node as an object in which each node is given a unique
ID and a balance. For each node, we assign two array lists to
model the local blockchain and the transactions pool. It is worth
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TABLE 1 | Input parameters for the simulator.
Type Parameter Description
Blocks
Binterval Average time to generate a block in seconds
Bsize Block size in Megabyte (MB)
Bdelay Propagation delay of blocks in seconds
Breward Block generation reward
Transactions
hasTrans Enable/Disabled transactions
Ttechnique Technique for modeling transactions
Tn Rate at which transactions can be created
Tdelay Propagation delay of transactions in seconds
Tfee Transaction fee
Tsize Transaction size in MB
Nodes Nn Total number of nodes in the network
Simulation
Simtime Length of the simulation time
Runs Number of simulation runs
noting that each node maintains a transactions’ pool only if the
full transaction technique is applied. Otherwise, a common pool
will be shared by all the nodes. Network class implements the
network latency for propagating both blocks and transactions
between the nodes. Currently, we implement the latency as a time
delay that can be configured by the user of the simulator in the
configuration module. Hence, it could be possible to extend this
class to implement a particular broadcast protocol.
Consensus Module: We implement the consensus module
in different classes, namely, Transaction, Block and Consensus.
Transaction class defines the structure of transactions in our
simulator. We implement each transaction as an object that has
seven attributes, namely, ID, timestamp, submitter ID, recipient
ID, value, size, and fee. The end-user can set the size and
fee of transactions in the configuration module as fixed values
or random values drawn from general distributions, including
exponential distribution. This class also implements both full
and light techniques for modeling transactions, as we discussed
in section 3.3.1. Block class defines the structure of blocks in
our simulator. We implement each block as an object that has
seven attributes, namely, depth, ID, previous ID, timestamp,
size, miner ID, and transactions. This class also implements
the processes required by the nodes to generate and receive
blocks, as discussed in section 3.3.2. Consensus class implements
the consensus algorithm as well as the fork resolution rule. It
also implements the process of selecting leaders, aka miners,
to generate and append new blocks to the ledger. This class is
structured to be easy to implement any consensus protocol of
interest. For instance, to implement PoW algorithm with the
longest-chain rule to resolve potential forks as the case in Bitcoin
and Ethereum.
Incentives Module: This module is responsible for setting
the rewarded elements as well as calculating the rewards. Also,
it distributes the rewards among the participating nodes by
increasing the balance of each node after calculating the rewards.
It is, however, possible to extend this module by adding more
rewarded elements or changing the way the awards are calculated
if required. To make it easier for the end-user, the rewards
(e.g., block rewards) can be configured and changed in the
configuration module.
5. BLOCKSIM CASE STUDIES
BlockSim is designed to be used for any type of blockchain,
and to demonstrate this we apply the Base Model of BlockSim
to simulate Bitcoin as well as Ethereum. We also discuss how
to extend the BlockSim implementation of the Base Model to
support any consensus algorithm of interest.
5.1. Bitcoin in BlockSim
To simulate Bitcoin we introduce the following modifications
and extensions to the core implementation of BlockSim discussed
in section 4.
Network Layer: For Bitcoin we abstract the underlying
broadcast protocol by modeling the propagation of transactions
and blocks as a time delay, as indicated in section 3.2. To
parameterize the model one can use DSN Bitcoin Monitoring to
obtain the propagation delay of information. The Node module
is extended with an attribute for a node’s hash power, which we
add to the configuration module for the user to set as an input
parameter. To distinguish between regular nodes and miners,
we can assign zero as the hash power for regular nodes to
indicate that the node cannot build blocks (only create and
propagate transactions).
Consensus Layer: Bitcoin uses PoW with the longest-chain
rule to resolve the forks. As discussed in section 2.2.2, in PoW
miners compete against each other to be allowed to create the
next block. They repeatedly draw a random number, combine
it with info from the new block and generate a hash. If the
hash fulfills some property, the block can be added to the
blockchain and forwarded to other nodes. That means miners
execute what amounts to a Bernouilli trial and since the number
of trials is high, the Bernouilli trials process converges to
its continuous-time counterpart, the Poisson Process. That is,
the time between successes is exponentially distributed. In the
configuration module, one can set the block difficulty through
the Binterval parameter, which is the time interval (in seconds)
between two consecutive blocks. If multiple chains have the same
depth, Bitcoin uses the longest chain to reach a global view of the
blockchain ledger by resolving the forks.
Incentives Layer: The incentives in Bitcoin for generating
blocks and executing transactions is the same as that of the Base
Model. In ourmain BlockSim implementation, all rewards will be
distributed tominers at the end of each simulation run. If needed,
the Incentives module can be modified to distribute rewards in
run-time. The miner of a block that is finalized and is part of
the longest chain receives the block reward and the fees for all
transactions included in that block. The rewards can be set in the
configuration module.
5.2. Ethereum in BlockSim
Ethereum is very similar to Bitcoin but introduces a few
additional elements associated with the handling of uncle blocks
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as well as attributes required for incentives associated with
smart contracts.
Network and Consensus Layers: Ethereum allows attaching
uncle blocks to a valid block and rewards miners for this.
Therefore, we extend the Bitcoin Node module with an
unclechain attribute. The unclechain for a node is modeled as an
array list storing all chains with uncle blocks that occur during the
simulation run. Ethereum allows miners to include a maximum
of 2 uncle blocks within the last seven block generations (e.g.,
an uncle block with a depth 10 can be referenced in a block
with a depth less than or equal to 17). We include this logic in
the configuration module and allow configuring the maximum
number of uncle blocks per block, the number of generations in
which an uncle block can be included as well as disabling uncle
inclusion mechanism if it is not of interest.
Similarly, we extend the Node module when receiving a
block. If the block has a smaller depth or index, the block
is appended to the recipient’s unclechain as an uncle block
to be referenced in a future block. Also, when receiving and
appending a valid block to the local blockchain ledger, the
miner updates its local unclechain, where necessary, by removing
all the uncle blocks that have already been included in the
received block.
Incentives Layer: The incentive model of Ethereum, similar
to that of Bitcoin, includes block reward and transactions fee.
Yet, Ethereum uses the Gas mechanism to calculate the fee
for transactions with smart contracts. To determine the fee for
transactions and blocks, we therefore require some additional
attributes related to the gas model. For transactions, we add
Gas Limit, Used Gas and Gas Price attributes. For blocks, we
include the attributes of Gas Limit and Used Gas. We refer
to the literature, e.g., Wood, 2014; Alharby and Van Moorsel,
2017 for details, but in short, Used Gas multiplied by the
Gas Price corresponds to the fee the miner receives, where
Used Gas depends on the computational requirements of the
smart contract (Aldweesh et al., 2018), but never exceeds
Gas Limit.
Ethereum also introduces rewards for uncle blocks. The uncle
reward is distributed between the miner who generated the uncle
and the miner who included it in his block, as follows (Wood,
2014). The miner who generated the uncle gets a variable reward
depending on when the uncle has been referenced in a main
block. The sooner the uncle is referenced in a block, the higher
the uncle reward (Runcle):
Runcle =
(
Duncle + (Guncle + 1)− Dblock) ∗
Rblock
Guncle + 1
(1)
where Duncle is the depth of the uncle, Guncle is the
number of generations in which the uncle can be included,
Dblock is the depth of the block and Rblock is the block
reward. The miner who included the uncle in his block
will get a fixed reward, which is calculated as 132 ∗ Rblock.
All this is implemented in the incentives module, but the
amount of rewards can be set in the configuration module,
if required.
TABLE 2 | Data gathered from Bitcoin and Ethereum, serves as input to the
simulation runs used as validation.
Parameters Bitcoin Ethereum
Binterval 596s 12.42s
Bdelay 0.42s 2.3s
Bsize 0.83MB 7,997,148Gas
Tsize 546Byte Distribution
5.3. Different Consensus Protocols in
BlockSim
Thus far we have mainly considered PoW as consensus protocol,
but there are many other, including Proof of Stake (PoS),
Proof of Authority, or message-based consensus algorithms such
as Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance and its many variants
(Angelis et al., 2018).
A significant difference between these protocols and PoW
is that in PoW miners are not directly selected by the
consensus protocol, but instead, miners continuously invest their
computing power to create the subsequent blocks. In PoS, for
instance, miners would be selected by the protocol based on
the amount of stake or cryptocurrencies they hold. The more
cryptocurrencies a miner deposited in the system, the more
chance they would be selected to generate the next block.
Other protocols select miners in a round-robin manner such as
Tendermint (Kwon, 2014) or based on different metrics (Angelis
et al., 2018).
To support approaches such as PoS, we modify the consensus
class by changing how miners are being selected to generate the
next blocks. Other consensus elements (e.g., transactions, blocks,
and fork resolution) and modules (simulation, network, and
incentives) remain unchanged. In general, as long as the output
metrics can be truthfully simulated with events scheduled at the
granularity of blocks, BlockSim can be extended in a natural
matter. The time consumed by the consensus algorithm would
then be represented by a delay. However, if one wants to analyze
the impact of specific message sequences on the performance
of PBFT style consensus protocols, BlockSim is a less obvious
candidate. For efficient (i.e., fast) simulation, one would study
such consensus protocols through simulation tools that operate
at message-level and not mix different levels of abstractions and
time granularity.
6. BLOCKSIM VALIDATION
A nice feature of the blockchain design is that it offers invariants
(such as the block creation interval) and plenty of publicly
available data to validate the results of any simulator. First we
compare BlockSim with existing blockchain systems (section
6.1), then we compare with various peer-reviewed studies
(section 6.2).
6.1. Comparison With Measurements
We compare the results from BlockSim with the most popular
public blockchains, Bitcoin and Ethereum. These provide certain
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TABLE 3 | Validation of the simulator results by comparison with measurements from Bitcoin and Ethereum.
Bitcoin Ethereum
Measured Simulated Measured Simulated
Bincluded 146± 4 143± 5 6083± 27 6079± 25
Stale (uncle) rate 0.025%± 0.051% 0.049%± 0.069% 12.56%± 0.43% 12.55%± 0.14%
Throughput 2.69± 0.09 2.66± 0.09 5.99± 0.18 6.96± 0.03
Bincluded is the number of blocks included in the main blockchain per day, the stale (or uncle) rate per day are blocks not in the main chain, and throughput is the number of transactions
processed per second.
“invariants” that we know to be true, such as the frequency of
generating blocks and the proportionality between the miner’s
hashing share and the probability to win the Proof of Work
competition. Bitcoin and Ethereum also provide ample public
data to validate our simulator.
Validation of block and transaction metrics: We use the
following metrics for validation: number of blocks created,
number of uncle or stale blocks (blocks that will not be part
of the final chain), and the number of transactions completed
per time unit. The results obtained from our simulator and
that from the actual systems are reported in Table 3. We report
both the average and the 95% confidence interval values, for
a run of the simulation that corresponds to a full month of
real time. From Table 3, we see that our simulator’s confidence
interval contains the result from the measurements. However,
our simulator shows a slightly higher throughput for Ethereum
compared to the real data observed. We believe that this is either
due to the small sample of transactions retrieved or the fitted
frequency distribution.
To obtain the above results, Table 2 shows the data gathered
from both Bitcoin and Ethereum used as input to the validation
runs. That is, we use the values from Table 2 for the relevant
input parameters given in Table 1. We gather the Bitcoin’s data
from blockchain.info2, while the Ethereum’s data comes from
etherscan.io3. We collect 1 month of data for each system as of
October 2018. From these sources, we were able to directly collect
all the necessary data, apart from the block propagation delay and
the transactions’ size in Ethereum. However, we obtain the block
delay using DSN Bitcoin Monitoring4 and ETHstats5. To obtain
the size of transactions in Ethereum, we implement a python
script that makes use of etherscan.io APIs to retrieve transactions
information. We retrieve the data for the latest 5,000 transactions
and then fit a frequency distribution for transactions’ size to be
used as input in our simulator. For the sake of this experiment,
we fit a frequency distribution with the limited collected data.
Validation of poW: An invariant we can use for validation is
the share of blocks each miner generates since it is known that
share is equal to the miner’s share of the overall hashing power.
For instance, if a miner controls 40% of the network’s hash
power, it should generate 40% of the total blocks. To validate
2https://www.blockchain.com/explorer
3https://etherscan.io/
4https://dsn.tm.kit.edu/bitcoin/
5https://ethstats.net/
FIGURE 5 | Validation of PoW using the fraction of generated blocks given the
hashing share of various miners.
PoW, we collect the estimated hash power as well as the fraction
of blocks contributed by Bitcoin miners and miner pools from
blockchain.info and input this into our simulator. That is, the
simulation is with miners that have the same share of the hashing
power as various existing Bitcoin miners.
Figure 5 shows the results. We simulate 4 days of the Bitcoin
network, a total of 1000 times and obtain the average fraction of
blocks generated by each miner. The x-axis of Figure 5 shows the
name of the miners and the y-axis shows the fraction of blocks
contributed by the miners for both the real Bitcoin network (the
green bars) and the simulation results (the gray bars). From
Figure 5, we see that the simulation results are very close to that
of the real Bitcoin network.
6.2. Comparison With Peer-Reviewed
Studies
We also compare the simulator results for the stale rate with
that of previous peer-reviewed studies. Decker and Wattenhofer
(2013) run an experiment on the Bitcoin blockchain by listening
to 10,000 blocks. They found the average block propagation delay
is 12.6 s and the stale rate is 1.69%. Gervais et al. (2016) run some
simulation experiments using the configurations of different
blockchain systems such as Bitcoin, Litecoin, and Dogecoin.
They found that their simulation results matched that of the
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TABLE 4 | A comparison between BlockSim and previous studies in terms of the
stale rate observed.
Input parameters Stale rate
Binterval (s) Bdelay(s) Measured
(%)
Simulated
(%)
Bitcoin (Gervais et al., 2016) 600 14.7 1.51 1.69±0.08
Bitcoin (Decker and Wattenhofer,
2013)
600 12.6 1.68 1.73±0.09
Litecoin (Gervais et al., 2016) 150 4.18 1.82 1.88±0.11
Dogecoin (Gervais et al., 2016) 60 2.08 2.15 2.38±0.08
actual systems. To validate our simulator against these studies,
we use the same configurations of the block interval (Binterval)
and block propagation delay (Bdelay) as reported in these studies.
We simulate each configuration for a total of 10,000 blocks and
report the average results obtained from 10 independent runs, see
Table 4. From Table 4, we see that the stale rates obtained from
our simulator are close to the ones reported in previous studies,
with a difference of less than 10%.
7. BLOCKSIM SIMULATION RESULTS
To show the applicability of our simulator, we conduct a
simulation experiment to investigate the impact of different
consensus and network parameters on the security, performance
and mining ecosystem of blockchain systems. We also show
the performance of the simulator in terms of run time. We
use very similar metrics as in the validation, but for a wider
range of parameter values. The main discussion in this section
is about how the stale block rate impacts mining decentralization
and how Ethereum’s approach to reward uncle blocks improves
mining decentralization.
More precisely, we study the impact of different combinations
of block interval and block propagation delay on the stale
rate, throughput and mining decentralization. Stale rate is a
security indicator of a blockchain system, and the lower the
rate, the better for the security of the system (Gervais et al.,
2016). Throughput represents the number of transactions that
can be processed per second, thus directly indicating how well
the system performs. Mining decentralization indicates that
the fraction of blocks a miner includes in the main ledger is
proportional to the hash power of that miner. In other words,
mining decentralization means each miner gets a fair reward
compared to its hash power.
Table 5 shows the results (stale rate, throughput and mining
decentralization) for 25 different combinations of different
block interval Binterval and block delay Bdelay as well as the
run time for every configuration. For ease of presentation, we
consider only five miners (M1, M2, . . . , M5) with hash powers
ranging from 5 to 40%. The hash power for a miner is a
configurable parameter (see section 5.1). For all configurations,
we set the block size to be 1MB and the average transaction
size to be 546 bytes (as in the Bitcoin network). We simulate
each configuration for a total of 10,000 blocks and report
the average results from 10 independent runs. The confidence
intervals are not reported here, but are all within 10% of the
average values.
Stale rate: From the stale rate results reported in Table 5, we
observe the following. First, reducing the block interval, i.e., the
time between successive blocks being created, leads to higher
stale rates, especially when the block interval is already small.
For instance, reducing the block interval from 12 to 1 s in the
case of 0.5 s block delay will result in an increase of the stale
rate by about sevenfold. When the block interval is small, other
nodes could manage to find the next block before hearing of
other competitive blocks due to the network latency, leading to
conflicts. Also, increasing the block propagation delay leads to
higher stale rates. For instance, the stale rate increases about
tenfold when increasing the delay from 0.5 to 16 s in the case of 12
s block interval. The block delay includes the block’s transmission
time as well as the verification of the block and its embedded
transactions (Decker and Wattenhofer, 2013). Thus, the bigger
the block size, the more time required to transmit and verify the
block. Hence, increasing the block size will result in higher stale
rates. Furthermore, to ensure the lowest stale rate the block delay
should be as small as possible and the block interval as large as
possible. For instance, in the case of 600 s block interval, the stale
rates are minimal since the block delay is only a tiny fraction of
the block interval.
Throughput: From the throughput results reported in Table 5,
we observe the following. First, reducing the block interval
leads to higher throughput. This is because more blocks will be
generated, and thus, more transactions will be processed. We
also observe that the block delay could reduce the throughput
significantly, especially when the block interval is small. The
number of transactions that can be processed per second is
reduced from 147 to 92 when increasing the block delay from 0.5
to 16 s in the case of 12 s block interval. Furthermore, the block
delay does not have a significant impact on the throughput if the
delay is too small compared to the block interval. For instance,
in the case of 600 s block interval, the throughput achieved
is almost the same even when the block delay is increased
from 0.5 to 16 s.
Mining decentralization: From the mining decentralization
results reported in Table 5, we observe the following. First and
most importantly, we observe a correlation between stale rates
andmining decentralization. The smaller the stale rates the better
the mining decentralization and vice versa. In the discussion
about stale rates, we observe that reducing the block interval or
increasing the block delay can lead to a higher stale rate. That is,
reducing the block interval leads to poormining decentralization.
In the case of 1 s block interval, for instance, miners with a large
hash power (e.g., M1) have a higher fraction of blocks included
in the main ledger, and thus gain higher profit, compared to their
hash power invested. On the contrary, small miners have a small
fraction of blocks included in the ledger, and thus gain less profit,
compared to their hash power invested. Similarly, increasing the
block delay negatively impacts the decentralization of the mining
process. For a bettermining decentralization, the stale rate should
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TABLE 5 | The simulation results (stale rate, throughput and the fraction of blocks contributed by each miner) as well as the run time performance (in seconds) for
different combinations of block interval and block propagation delay.
Input parameters Mining decentralization (% blocks contributed by miners)
Binterval Bdelay Stale rate (%) Throughput M1(40%) M2(30%) M3(15%) M4(10%) M5(5%) Run time
1
0.5 24.74 1387.74 43.54 30.13 13.51 8.65 4.17 15.9
2 45.43 997.34 49.42 30.14 10.98 6.501 2.96 16.25
4 54.81 829.17 54.76 29.33 8.96 4.86 2.09 13.25
8 62.69 680.77 60.05 28.49 6.71 3.53 1.22 10.51
16 68.77 569.93 66.36 26.48 4.50 2.0 0.67 8.29
12
0.5 3.49 147.26 40.27 30.15 14.82 9.86 4.90 4.41
2 11.62 135.11 41.23 30.24 14.40 9.41 4.73 11.19
4 19.33 123.02 42.60 30.17 13.77 9.09 4.37 14.08
8 28.8 108.61 44.42 30.10 13.05 8.34 4.08 16.68
16 39.55 92.09 47.32 30.39 11.83 7.30 3.16 17.64
60
0.5 0.7 30.17 40.06 30.05 14.88 10.15 4.86 2.21
2 2.79 29.79 40.09 30.07 15.02 9.88 4.95 3.87
4 5.36 28.6 40.50 29.94 14.94 9.72 4.90 5.93
8 9.7 27.56 41.23 30.03 14.40 9.60 4.74 10.06
16 16.45 25.51 42.00 30.24 14.15 9.11 4.51 13.12
150
0.5 0.29 12.23 39.95 29.94 15.07 10.03 5.00 1.86
2 1.21 12.06 39.81 30.07 15.21 9.89 5.02 2.86
4 2.23 11.96 40.32 30.06 14.76 9.93 4.94 3.5
8 4.33 11.62 40.48 29.96 14.86 9.80 4.90 5.11
16 8.15 11.3 40.89 29.78 14.82 9.77 4.75 7.95
600
0.5 0.08 3.03 39.97 29.98 15.03 9.96 5.06 1.67
2 0.32 3.05 40.00 29.90 15.11 10.00 4.99 1.84
4 0.61 3.05 40.10 30.24 14.83 9.85 4.98 2.23
8 1.14 3.01 39.91 29.99 15.17 9.91 5.02 2.91
16 2.26 2.99 39.98 29.99 15.07 10.04 4.92 3.67
be reduced by having the block interval relatively larger than the
block delay.
Run time performance: For every combination of
configurations, we show the average time (in seconds) it
takes the simulator to perform a single run. To obtain the run
time results, we use a laptop with a 2.30GHz Intel i5 CPU with
16GB RAM running on Windows 10. From Table 5, we observe
the following. First, the run time generally takes seconds to
simulate 10,000 blocks. We note that in this experiment there
are five miners and increasing the number of miners would
increase the run time since more actions need to be performed
in the network. For example, every new miner has to maintain
a ledger and update it every time a new block is announced
in the network. At the same time, increasing the number of
non-miners would not affect the run time that much as they
are not participating in maintaining the ledger. Secondly, the
run time increases for higher stale rates (setting with small
Binterval or large Bdelay). This is because miners need to update
their ledgers more frequently than when conflicts are rare.
Surprisingly, when the stale rate is high (over 50%) the run
time seems to be decreasing. We believe the explanation for
this is that although more blocks are in the system, miners
neglect most blocks as they arrive when the miner is behind
the main chain.
Bitcoin throughput: The current implementation of Bitcoin
compromises of 596 s block interval and 0.42 s block delay, as
reported in Table 2. That means the Bitcoin network experiences
a low stale rate as well as a good mining decentralization.
However, it suffers from poor throughput as the number
of transactions processed per second is only about 3. We
argue that we could securely reduce the block interval of
Bitcoin to 60 s to improve the throughput by about a
factor 10, without any significant impact on the stale rate o
r mining decentralization.
Ethereum mining decentralization through uncle inclusion:
The current implementation of Ethereum compromises of 12.42
s block interval and 2.3 s block delay, as reported in Table 2.
This results in a stale rate of about 12.56% and imperfect
mining decentralization, but a better throughput than the Bitcoin
blockchain. To eliminate the negative impact on the stale rate
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TABLE 6 | The fraction of rewards gained by each miner (M1,M2,…,M5), with and
without uncle inclusion mechanism.
Miners (%) Fraction of rewards
Without uncle inclusion (%) With uncle inclusion (%)
M1 40 41.32 40.2
M2 30 30.28 30.18
M3 15 14.47 14.91
M4 10 9.34 9.85
M5 5 4.6 4.86
and mining decentralization, Ethereum uses an uncle inclusion
mechanism, where stale blocks are included in the main ledger
as uncle blocks and the miners of such blocks are rewarded.
However, this does not guarantee that miners will receive fair
rewards compared to their hash power invested (e.g., a miner
with a hash power of 20% should receive 20% of the total rewards
distributed in the network). This is especially true as miners get
a lower reward for uncle blocks compared to main blocks as
well as they are not rewarded for the transactions included in
the uncle blocks.
We use the same parameters as currently in Ethereum
to further explore whether the fraction of rewards a miner
would receive with uncle inclusion mechanism is proportional
to its hash power. We execute 10 independent simulation
runs of 10,000 blocks and report the average results in
Table 6. From Table 6, we see that the fraction of rewards
gained by the miners with uncle inclusion mechanism is
closer to their hash power than in the case where the
uncle mechanism is not applied. Thus, Ethereum indeed
achieves a better mining decentralization using its uncle
inclusion mechanism.
8. DISCUSSION: EVALUATION OF
BLOCKSIM AGAINST DESIGN
OBJECTIVES
We evaluate our simulator against the design criteria
mentioned in section 3.1, which are generality, extensibility
and simplicity.
Generality: Generality refers to the ability to use BlockSim
for a variety of analysis questions and for a variety of
blockchains. The key technology to achieve generality is the
BlockSim Base Model, which has been designed in such a
way that many blockchain systems and analysis questions
can be answered. The Base Model covers all common
building blocks of blockchains such as nodes, transactions,
blocks, blockchain ledger, fork resolution and incentive models.
We have demonstrated the application of blockchain to
analyze Bitcoin and Ethereum, and arguably BlockSim is well-
suited for the full class of permissionless blockchain systems.
Furthermore, BlockSim achieves generality by supporting
different properties and metrics such as performance (both
throughput and latency), functionality metrics such as stale
rates and system properties such as mining decentralization
and mining incentives. To further support this criterion,
however, we aim to model and implement different consensus
protocols (e.g., Proof-of-Stake) as well as different generic
broadcast protocols for the Network layer in a later version
of BlockSim.
Extensibility: Extensibility refers to the ability of the BlockSim
tool to be extended in a natural manner for various systems and
analysis problems. This comes down to the design of the software,
which is through modules that can easily be manipulated and
extended to investigate different properties or problems of
interest. The user of the simulator can use common object
oriented programming techniques such as inheritance to extend
current modules either by adding new functionalities (classes,
methods or attributes) or modifying (overriding) some of the
existing ones.
In sections 5.1, 5.2, we show how we extend the base modules
of BlockSim to support the implementation of Bitcoin and
Ethereum. For instance, we extend the Node module by adding
an attribute for a node’s hash power.
As another example, we will briefly explain how to extend
BlockSim to support different malicious behaviors of the nodes
(e.g., selfish mining strategies). The current implementation of
BlockSim assumes that all nodes are honest. To support such
behaviors, we can extend the Node module by introducing a new
attribute (e.g., selfish) for each behavior. Hence, each behavior
needs to be adequately defined (e.g., by writing a function
or a separate class that specifies the procedures involved in
this behavior).
To establish selfish mining behavior for a node, for instance,
we configure that node to work on its fork without propagating
the blocks it generates to other nodes in the network. Once
the behaviors are defined, the user of the simulator has only
to access the configuration module and choose which type
of behaviors to be studied when defining the nodes, without
modifying the underlying code of the simulator. Similar to
this is the study of the uncertainty problem miners face
during the selection of transactions (Alharby and Van Moorsel,
2018), and the analysis of the Ethereum Verifier’s Dilemma
(Alharby et al., 2020).
Simplicity: BlockSim achieves this criterion as it has been
implemented in different modules as well as it provides a user
interface (a configuration module) that allows the end-user to set
up the input parameters for the simulator. This makes BlockSim
easy to use and understand. Besides, the current version of
BlockSim hides and abstracts many details. For example, it
abstracts all the details of the network layer by only introducing
a configurable time delay for information propagation to model
this layer. Also, it hides details about the validation process
of blocks and transactions. By doing so, BlockSim becomes
simple and easy to use and understand. Although hiding
and abstracting details can result in an incomplete model, it
is possible to extend BlockSim to incorporate these details
if required.
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9. RELATED WORK
In the literature, there are some attempts to utilize simulation
models to evaluate various aspects of blockchain systems. In
Yasaweerasinghelage et al. (2017), the authors use architectural
modeling and simulation to measure the latency in blockchain
systems under different configurations. In Alharby and
Van Moorsel (2018), the authors propose a simulation model
to investigate the impact of profit uncertainty in the Ethereum
blockchain. They found that miners in Ethereum are not able
to make informed decisions about which transactions to include
in their blocks to maximize their revenue. In Neudecker et al.
(2015), the authors propose a simulation model to analyze
and evaluate attacks on the Bitcoin network. In Göbel et al.
(2016), the authors use discrete-event simulation to study the
behavior of Bitcoin miners (including selfish-mining strategies)
when there is a delay in propagating information among
miners. Besides these proposals, there are some blockchain
simulators proposed in the literature. In Gervais et al. (2016), the
authors propose a Bitcoin simulator to analyze the security and
performance of different configurations in both the consensus
and network layers.
Several others Bitcoin-like network simulators are proposed
in the literature such as Aoki et al. (2019), Miller and Jansen
(2015), and Stoykov et al. (2017). However, these proposals utilize
simulation-based models to study specific aspects of blockchain
systems. They neither cross different layers nor cover all common
functional building blocks (e.g., blocks and transactions) for
blockchain systems. For instance, neither of these proposals
model transactions in the blockchain system nor capture the
incentives layer in the same detail as BlockSim.
With BlockSim we provide a general-purpose, widely usable,
simulation tool for blockchains, to assist in answering a variety of
design and deployment questions. Our discrete-event simulator
generalizes on the ones proposed in the related literature by
integrating different layers of the blockchain system to gain
a more comprehensive insight into different aspects such as
performance, security, and incentives. In BlockSim, for instance,
we take a step further by considering the functional blocks
common across the different implementation of blockchain
systems. We design and structure BlockSim to cross different
layers of blockchains. Furthermore, we model transactions in two
different ways, each of which for specific purposes as well as
modeling both Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchains.
10. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes BlockSim, a discrete-event simulation
framework for blockchain systems, capturing network,
consensus and incentives layers of blockchain systems. The
simulation tool is implemented in Python and is available
for general use. We introduce the design and evaluate
it against the design objectives of generality, extensibility
and simplicity.
BlockSim’s results have been validated by comparing it
with design properties and measurement studies available from
real-life blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. We also
demonstrated the use of BlockSim in a study of stale rate,
throughput and mining decentralization across a variety of
blockchain configurations.
Future work should further demonstrate the extensibility of
BlockSim by implementing additional variants of blockchain
systems, such as those based on Proof of Stake as well as
blockchains augmented with channels. In addition, one can
build on the current version of BlockSim and extend it
with additional reusable classes that represent other important
system aspects and mechanisms, in particular mining pools
and channels.
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